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Abstract: 
 
Workers’ compensation and disability management in the hazardous occupations of 
mining and construction are ongoing concerns for employers, employees, insurers and 
Governments.  Rising insurance costs, options of self insurance models, highly 
competitive tendering, legislative rigidities, and escalating costs of compensation, 
have contributed to industry practices for injured workers that are driven by cost 
containment strategies rather than benchmarked disability management processes.  In 
this article a critical review of legislation, industry practices, and published reports is 
undertaken with a view to outlining the adequacy of current and planned services and 
practices to meet the needs of injured workers in both sectors.  Attention is also given 
to industrial practices that contra-indicate quality disability management processes.  
The authors detail a number of industrial and organisational operating environments 
which have arisen from legislative frameworks, financial constraints, and outdated 
disability management practices.  They comment on the more recently introduced 
legislation and offer comment on its potential to drive benchmark changes in the 
building and coalmining sectors. Finally, suggestions are provided for more 
contemporary approaches to the insurance framework and return to work facilitation 
for injured workers.      
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Introduction 
 
Workers’ compensation and rehabilitation is an ongoing concern for employers, 
employees, insurers and governments in Australia.  In NSW, despite the falling trend 
in compensated injuries from 1994/95 and declining incidence (number of injuries per 
1000 workers) and frequency rates (number of injuries per million hours worked), 
costs other than the ‘gross incurred’ cost reported as declining by WorkCover NSW in 
2000 (Statistical Bulletin 1998-99), continue to rise.  Rising costs are a factor of all of 
Australia’s disparate OHS/workers’ compensation jurisdictions despite their 
variations of approach.  In fact, the gross incurred costs published by WorkCover 
NSW are only a faction of the real costs of injured workers, to society and the 
economy.  There are many incalculable macro-economic and intangible social costs 
even though the National Occupation Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) has 
tried spasmodically to calculate the full costs of injuries to the nation unsuccessfully.   
 
At the micro-economic level workplace and workers’ compensation costs and legal 
requirements are also a major concern to employers specifically as well as the loss of 
productivity and production.  In NSW a specific area of concern to smaller employers 
in particular is the inability to observe the rehabilitation requirements of the 1987 
Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) (prior to its 2001 amendments) and its 
companion legislation, the (amended) Workplace Injury Management and Workers’ 
Compensation Act, 1998, which are perceived as too complicated, too costly and time 
consuming.  All of these requirements hold out alluring, but illegal, incentives to 
understate the nature of injuries, to under-report incidence, to pass some of as illness 
or not to report at all.  In NSW since the 1987Act it has been compulsory to 
rehabilitate and to have injury management procedures in place.  Some employers 
engage in various avoidance activities and some of those undertaken by employers to 
subvert legal requirements are achieved with the collaboration of employees.  
Employees collude with employers in these activities for a variety of reasons.  One of 
the objectives of this paper is to examine the process of the observance of legislative 
requirements perceived by some employers as being resource intensive with 
unnecessary administrivia that motivate them not to report injuries; another is to 
determine whether the rehabilitation and associated injury management processes are 
too onerous and time consuming to encourage their full utilisation.  This paper is 
specifically concerned with the practice and application of injury management in the 
construction and coal mining industries of NSW. 
 
 
Industrial and Organisational Operating Environments 
 
Construction 
 
The NSW construction industry, like the NSW coalmining industry, is based on 
inherently hazardous labour processes.  The inherent hazards and associated risks of 
the construction industry are reflected in its high incidence and frequency injury rates 
demonstrated by the fact that in 1998/99, construction had the third highest incidence 
based on compensated injuries (WorkCover NSW 2000).   
 
In contrast to the coalmining industry which only has two discrete distinct portions, 
open cut and underground mining, construction has several sub-sectors ranging from 
housing to major high-rise buildings as well as bridge, road, tunnel and even under 
water construction.  Each sector has its distinct hazards and risks determined by the 
particularities of its labour process as indeed every production process does 
irrespective of whether a good or service is produced.  Notwithstanding the 
individuality of their production processes each sector has extreme hazards in 
common with the other compared to most other industries outside mining, fishing, 
forestry and agriculture.  Additionally, an aspect in common is that the actual location 
of production can change daily or even several times within a day so that each change 
has its inherent and potentially unpredictable hazards (in this regard construction and 
mining also have commonality and in fact there are many basic similarities between 
the non-housing sector and open cut mining).  Other commonalities between the 
construction sectors are that they rely heavily on contractors and sub-contractors and 
that the industry is highly competitive and relies on gaining projects/jobs by putting in 
the lowest tenders/quotes.  Frequently, corners have to be cut and all too often safety 
is one of the first to suffer budget costs or even workers’ compensation premiums 
may not be paid. 
 
There are many incentives not to report or to under report injuries in the construction 
industry.  A prime consideration is financial:  Construction being an industry with one 
of the highest incidence and frequency rates also has one of the highest base rate 
industry worker’s compensation premiums.  The construction industry relies heavily 
on contractors and sub-contractors whose injury rates and safety systems could 
determine whether contracts are awarded or not.  Over the last few years because it 
has become mandatory to submit injury records and evidence of safety management 
systems for government project tenders:  Principal contractors increasingly ask for 
documentation of this nature as well for non public sector projects.  Sub-contractors 
with high injury rates may be passed over because under the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act 2000 the principal contractor is held responsible for the oversight of all 
OHS matters.  (Under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983, which the 2000 
Act replaced in 2001, non and under reporting by sub contractors were 
commonplace).   
 
Consequently sub-contractors may resort to many practices to avoid reporting 
employees’ injuries; some having their basis in deception consisting of claiming days 
off for injuries as sick leave, not reporting injuries at all or placing injured workers on 
light office duties instead of their regular work.  It is also beneficial for sub-
contractors to return injured employees to work prematurely to evade statutorial 
rehabilitation requirements.  That smaller employers resort to these measures is not 
entirely surprising for two reasons:  The first is that the statutory rehabilitation and 
injury management processes insinuate what smaller employers do illegitimately; that 
is, to get workers back to work early and to find alternative duties if necessary.  
Second, the rehabilitation requirements, which are onerous, can easily be met by 
larger employers who generally have the human resources as well as the capacity to 
pay.  As is the case with much workplace legislation (i.e., industrial relations and 
OHS law) laws of this nature are framed for large employers and quite often 
disadvantage small employers.   
 
Another factor in under-declaring or non-reporting injuries is that many sub 
contractors are sole employers who simply cannot afford to take time off work.  In 
addition, since the introduction of the federal Workplace Relations Act in 1996, NSW 
construction industry workers subject to federal awards have also entered into 
individual Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) or other stand-alone contracts 
whose terms and conditions are confidential between them and their employer.  
Owing to the individualised nature (and alleged reduced entitlements and less secure 
conditions) of these employment contracts, AWAs make them much more susceptible 
not to report an injury for several reasons including non-renewal of contracts or 
blacklisting in the industry.  Construction workers employed under the enterprise 
bargaining framework/award system may also be persuaded by employers not to 
report an injury.  They may also collude with employers not to report an injury, but to 
take light duties and claim sick leave, to be paid shiftwork penalties while working on 
day shift or to work part of their shifts, but to be paid in full. 
 
Stigmatisation of injured employees and incentives to collude with employers not to 
report an injury is not uncommon and not limited to either the construction or 
coalmining industries.  It is common knowledge that employees who have been 
injured and compensated find it hard to get re-employed with other employers (vide 
Bohle and Quinlan; 2000, pp 346, 347 for example), in particular in the same 
industry.  It was brought to the attention of one of the authors of this paper how 
compensated former employees of a state service provider were prevented from re-
entering the service even after a long absence in another stand-alone section because 
the employees’ details were kept on the shared electronic data base provided by the 
insurer.   
 
Fraudulent behaviour is not limited to small employers or employees.  Employers of 
all sizes may knowingly avoid taking out the compulsorily required workers’ 
compensation which is made possible by the transient nature of employment in the 
construction industry.  Employers may also understate the size of their workforce or 
their payroll or the categories of labour employed to reduce the size of the workers 
compensation premiums (vide for example Bohle and Quinlan; 2000, p. 348).  These 
practices leave workers uncovered should they be injured and may induce employers 
not to report. 
 
There is yet another reason why injuries may not be reported.  The most prevalent 
permanent injuries across all NSW industries frequently are, ‘sprains, strains of joints 
and adjacent muscles’, which accounted for more than 50 % of permanent injuries 
recorded in 1998/99 and 54-57% of total compensation payments (WorkCover NSW; 
2000, p. 49).  Construction is no exception.  During 1998/99 out of the total number 
of 5 232 reported construction industry injuries, 2 858 were sprains and strains with 1 
384 sprains and strains to the back whereas there were only 52 sprains and strains to 
the hands, fingers and thumbs as opposed to 217 fractures, 444 open wounds; 113 
contusions and crushing injuries to the hands, fingers and thumbs, but only 37 
superficial injuries, 18 burns and 7 dislocations and one superficial injury to the back 
(WorkCover NSW; 2000, Appendix E, table 3.5 e).  Although the statistics of 
reported injuries reproduced here are only a small sample, the nature of the most 
prevalent injuries suggests that they are serious.  In fact, under the ‘macho’ hegemony 
which is highly prevalent in a male dominated industry like the construction industry 
(and as well in coalmining) it would be considered unmanly to report an injury such 
as a contusion, a dislocation or a burn of the hands, fingers and thumbs.   
 
Coal Mining 
 
Even though mining has a small workforce it had the highest incidence of 
compensated injury rates during 1998/99 as well as the highest incidence injury rate 
(54.6 per 1000 workers and the highest cost per case of all industries ($30 359) 
(WorkCover NSW; 2000, p. 15).  In the mining sector which largely comprises 
coalmining,   
 
“Almost half of the cases in mining and 57% of the costs were reported 
from sprains, strains of joints and adjacent muscles.  61% of reported 
injuries and 45 % per cent of costs were due to temporary disabilities 
resulting in time off work of less than 6 months” (WorkCover NSW; 
2000, p. 15).   
 
These kind of injury rates illustrates that it is a hazardous industry.  Even so, in all 
probability the above injury statistics are not a true reflection of actual injuries 
incurred.   In 1994 the industry’s principal union, the Construction Forestry Mining 
and Energy Union (CFMEU) expressed concern over claims practices; 
 
“…..at the way in which LTI [lost time injuries] statistics are being 
manipulated through the use of light duties and other devices that prevent 
injured employees appearing in official statistics.  The seeming steep 
improvement in the record of some mines is the result of changed 
administrative arrangements as much as any actual improvement in 
workplace performance” (CFMEU; 1994, p. 78). 
 
These kinds of sleights of hand and others such as conveying injured miners to and 
from work in taxis to perform little or no non-mining work, resonate with those of the 
construction industry.  One complicating factor of OHS practices and workers’ 
compensation claims practice in the NSW coalmining industry is that it is a self 
insurer with a keen eye on minimising workers’ compensation claims under the 
coordination of the Joint Coal Board (JCB) which however currently does not control 
the enforcement of OHS in the industry.  The other significant factor is that the 
jurisdiction of WorkCover is ambiguous and not enforced and that the industry was 
not fully regulated under the ambit of the OHS Act 1983, NSW (Winder, Dingsdag 
and Dain, 1996, pp.98, 99) in force until September  2001 when it was replaced by the 
OHS Act 2000.   
 
There is still debate within the coalmining industry as to whether the 1983 Act applied 
to coalmines and the issue is not yet resolved under the current Act (although the 
Minister for Industrial Relations was considering the ‘island’ status of the Coal Mines 
Regulation Act (CMRA) 1982).  Section 30 of the OHS Act 1983 stated that 
provisions of the Act with regard to appointment and powers of inspectors did not 
apply to, ‘a mine within the meaning of the Mines Inspection Act 1901 or the Coal 
Mines Regulation Act 1982,’ and similar exclusions are found under Section 49 of the 
2000 Act.  This proviso has produced a perception among managers in the coalmining 
industry that they are exempt from all provisions of the OHS Act with regards to 
safety management.  However, with the exception of powers of inspectors, all other 
provisions of the OHS Act applied to coalmines.  Yet, the Act could not be enforced 
by WorkCover inspectors.  Therefore, enforcement of the provisions of the Act 
technically fell to the inspectors of the Department of Mineral Resources who operate 
under the CMRA 1982 which makes no provisions for workers’ compensation 
arrangements.  The perception of being exempted from provisions of the OHS Act is 
persistent and seems to have isolated the NSW coalmining industry from safety 
management requirements and workers’ compensation systems and practices that are 
standard for other industries. 
 
There was and there remains another unresolved complicating factor of overlapping 
authority of the Department of Mines/Mineral Resources and the Joint Coal Board.  
The original influence of the JCB over the NSW coalmining industry was all 
pervasive and premised on resurrecting a largely moribund industry by increasing 
production and productivity at any cost.  Created in 1946 the JCB even had the power 
to close down mines and take them over on the grounds of safety (Dingsdag, 1989).  
The JCB never invoked those powers.  In 1988 these powers were significantly 
reduced under the Hawke Government, when one of its main activities became to 
administer and monitor Coal Mines Insurance, the industry owned workers’ 
compensation insurer and again in 1992, when the JCB became mainly responsible to 
monitor industry health and safety.  As observed by Dingsdag (1989) the JCB had a 
less than satisfactory system of recording LTIs although its performance in managing 
health was exemplary.  Notwithstanding the JCB’s unlimited authority until 1988, 
mine safety was almost exclusively left regulated by the Department of Mines (which 
became the Department of Mineral Resources) under the NSW Coal Mines 
Regulation Act 1912, a stand-alone Act in force until 1984.  In this instance there is 
the dichotomy of divergent regulatory authorities rather than the internal 
contradictions of WorkCover’s functions. 
 
Further, from the outset when the JCB assumed control over the NSW coalmining 
industry in 1946 the industry continued to rely on the ‘control and command’ style of 
management predicated on the absolute control of a mine bestowed on managers 
under coalmining legislation since 1854, 1861 and the first CMRA enacted in 1876 
overseen by the Department of Mines inspectorate.  In fact, it could be argued that the 
overlapping authority of the JCB and the Department of Mines, which were never 
resolved jurisdictionally even under the CMRA 1982 which repealed the 1912 Act, 
allowed the command and control style of management to flourish.  The inherent flaw 
of all of the successive CRMAs (including the current Act) was that managers are the 
legislatively responsible person for all matters relating to safety but that the Acts do 
not recognise that they are also responsible to ensure the maximum production of the 
mine.  These countervailing duality of roles create a precarious responsibility in 
matters of safety as well as workers’ compensation which is made more uncertain by 
the manager’s absolute control which as evidence suggests is all too often predicated 
on putting production first (vide Dingsdag 1989; 1993; Hopkins 1995; Hopkins 1999 
for example).  
 
Recent Legislation 
 
Context 
 
In the last decade or so Australian governments have succumbed to pressures from 
their own depleting treasuries, from unions, employers insurers and their lobbyists to 
reform workers’ compensation and OHS legislation to reduce the occurrence of 
injuries and to expedite their treatment when they do occur.  Most likely, the majority 
of corresponding measures have been introduced to reduce the financial burden on 
governments primarily, rather than to minimise excessiveness of incidence and 
frequency at the workplace as a co-related, but seemingly secondary objective.   
 
In NSW these objectives are even more complex:  The two separate functions of 
‘policing and enforcing’ OHS legislation, i.e., the prevention of injuries (and 
fatalities); and ensuring that injured workers are compensated fairly and expeditiously 
(and deceased employees’ family compensated) could be seen to be compromised.  
This compromise arises because the two state instrumentalities that performed these 
functions were combined under one state agency, WorkCover in 1988.  Arguably, 
there is a potential for conflict of interests (which is not unique to WorkCover; vide 
for example Dingsdag and Lee (1999) for the competing functions of the NSW 
Department of Mines/Mineral Resources and above for other instances).  On the one 
hand, WorkCover, maintains an inspectorate to deal with issues and breaches of the 
OHS Act 2000 and its associated regulations and codes of practice.  However, the 
enforcement functions consist, among others, of identifying or preventing risks 
observed by the WorkCover inspectorate based on identified hazards.  Yet, the 
workers’ compensation arm may wish to suppress this knowledge because of the 
financial implications it may have on costs and claims (Bohle and Quinlan; 2000, pp. 
354, 355). 
 
Other examples of reforms in NSW to minimise financial responsibility are the ill-
fated attempts by the Unsworth Government to limit claims for injury to workers’ 
compensation provisions without recourse to common law in 1987 (only to have the 
legislation overturned by the Greiner Government in 1989).  Another instance was the 
more successful accomplishment by the Kennett Government of Victoria in doing so 
for a longer period.  Despite the introduction in NSW of the Workplace Injury 
Management and Workers Compensation Act in 1998 to minimise workers’ 
compensation claims’ duration and their costs, these have not fallen sufficiently to 
satisfy employers or insurers and successive governments.  On the other hand, as far 
as the trade union movement is concerned injured employees are not receiving their 
entitlements and related industrial matters are often disputed with employers and are 
the basis of a great deal of litigation in the industrial relations jurisdictions.   
 
The current NSW Government amended the WCA 1987 in 2001 to do what the 
Unsworth Government ultimately failed; that is, to prevent or curb recourse to 
common law for injured workers.  It is also intended to limit the statutorially 
determined lump sum payments under workers’ compensation legislation according to 
the Table of Disabilities and to minimise or extinguish right of appeal.  As in 1987, 
lawyers were and are fiercely opposed to these changes and the Minister for Industrial 
Relations was also subject to a fierce industrial campaign from the NSW Trades and 
Labor Council.  Under amended legislation and the auspices of the newly established 
Workers’ Compensation Commission, claims for injury are determined under the 
“North American medical model” under which government appointed medical experts 
assess the amount of compensation according to the severity of the injury as a portion 
of ‘total body’ disability.  Under the model a 15 % of total body disability threshold 
for injury qualifies the claimant to seek common law remedy.  However, physical 
injuries and psychological/ psychiatric injuries arising from the same incident are not 
assessed together as they were under the previous legislative provisions.  
Psychological injury must be separately assessed at 15 % before compensation is 
granted.  Compensation for pain and suffering accompanying the injury, which was 
the basis for common law claims, can be denied unless the degree of permanent 
impairment has been assessed by an “approved” medical specialist.  Pain and 
suffering are assessed separately, not as a combined injury or the result of one injury, 
although more than one physical impairment resulting from the same incident can be 
regarded as one injury.  So far, since the inception of the new workers’ compensation 
arrangements, to the knowledge of the authors, no injured worker has attained the 15 
% threshold.   
 
Financial measures 
 
Financial incentives have been a feature of workers’ compensation arrangements 
since the introduction of the NSW Workers’ Compensation Act in 1987 and in 
alignment with the other Australian jurisdictions they are generally based on excess 
payments and experience ratings for employers with penalties and bonuses.  A general 
critique of workers’ compensation incentives is that they induce a lack of 
attentiveness with the minimisation of injuries by employers which is contrary to the 
duty of care required under the OHS Act 2000, as it was under its predecessor (Bohle 
and Quinlan; 2000; Hopkins; 1995; Johnstone; 1997; Purse; 2000).  In NSW 
employers are levied the first $500 of weekly payments for an injured worker while 
off work.  The thinking is that this kind of ‘incentive’ will encourage employers to 
manage OHS requirements more conscientiously (Purse; 2000, p.24).   
 
Under experience rating which applies to employers with more than 130 employees, 
the base industry rate of workers’ compensation premiums is adjusted on the basis of 
claims experience over three years.  These adjustments can make significant 
differences to the percentage of the pay roll employers pay in premiums, especially 
for very large organisations.  Some organisations can see the financial and safety 
gains made by making the workplace safer and have a genuine commitment to safety.  
Other organisations also recognise the benefit of becoming self insurers in this regard 
by better managing their safety by preventing injury as well as their compensation 
claims.  Becoming a self insurer however, may also induce managers to under-report 
or even not to report.  Even in large organisations like DuPont, renowned for its 
commitment to OHS, an over zealous application of approaches like Target Zero in 
injury prevention could lead to non-reporting of injuries.    
 
Notwithstanding conscientious employers, as it was the case before the introduction 
of incentives, some employers factor in the projected premium as a necessary and 
unavoidable cost of production seeing it as cheaper than implementing the legally 
required, but more costly, process of making the workplace safer.  These are 
calculated risks made on homespun, but experientially related estimates and predicted 
incidence of injuries:  Further, many workplaces almost never (some never) receive a 
visit from a WorkCover inspector which is hardly surprising seeing there are currently 
about 400 inspectors in NSW with more than 300 000 workplaces to inspect aside 
from their other duties.  It is largely when there is a critical incident involving a 
serious injury, a fatality or multiple injuries/deaths that workplace management faces 
the force of the law and pays in terms of loss of production, replacement of the 
technology that caused the harm, heavy fines, litigation and workers’ compensation.  
In the opinion of many employers these are chances well worth taking. 
 
The “Management” Process 
 
There are typically three separate but interlinked concepts that are discerned in the 
research and practice literature.  They are case management, injury management and 
disability management.  All three are important in conceptualising and planning an 
effective response to accidents and injury in the workplace.  A comprehensive 
overview of these concepts and their application in Australia is provided by Kendall, 
O’Neill, Murphy, & Bursnell (2001). 
 
Case Management 
 
Case management has become a familiar term over the past decade in most fields of 
health and welfare practice.  Based on a simple principle of fitting services to the needs 
of clients rather than the reverse, the concept arose from experiments in the delivery of 
human services in the United States in the late 1960's.  Initial use of case management 
centred on nursing, aged services and disability services and has been extended to 
include services in employment services, child protection services, primary medical care 
and legal services. 
 
Case management in rehabilitation services has been a prominent feature of service 
delivery internationally and in Australia for quite some time.  As Biggs (1998) noted 
several studies over the last decade have examined the competency base of the 
rehabilitation counsellor and invariably case management skills are a prominent 
requirement in such professional positions.  In addition, as Leahy et al. (1997) report, 
greater attention in rehabilitation is now being given to micro-skills or sub competencies 
under the overall benchmark of case management.  Further, as Biggs & Flett (1995) have 
noted in a review of significant rehabilitation competency research from 1969 to 1995, 
case management has increased its overall importance in both professional practice and 
in the theoretical underpinning of educational and training courses for case managers. 
 
The underpinning ideals of cost containment and service coordination are key goals in 
the majority of case management systems (Austin & McClelland, 1996).  Case 
management is essential in the provision of occupational rehabilitation services, as a 
result of the complex nature of the rehabilitation process itself, and the large number 
of stakeholders often involved with a worker throughout the post injury/illness phase 
(Kenny, 1995). 
 
Although the professional responsible for case management varies across 
jurisdictions, the core functions and underpinning principles of case management 
often remain similar.  The essential functions of case management include (1) 
assessment of need, whereby an individual’s unmet needs are identified pertaining to 
a specific situation; (2) planning/goal setting, whereby a realistic and relevant plan is 
developed with the individual to develop strategies to meet those needs; (3) 
coordination, whereby services are identified and access to them planned in a timely 
and logical manner to address individual needs; (4) implementation or linking, which 
involves the linking of the client to required services and the operationalisation of the 
overall case management plan; and (5) monitoring and evaluation, which involves 
both the formal and informal monitoring of the plan and the related outcomes (Austin 
& McClelland, 1996; Rothman, 1991).   
 
Injury Management 
 
To assist in effectively managing the phenomenon of workplace injury, injury 
management has been widely adopted in occupational rehabilitation and 
compensation systems (Shrey & Lacerete, 1995; Kenny & Jones, 1999).  This concept 
is defined as an active process of minimising the injury and the impact of an injury or 
impairment (resulting from injury or disability) on an individual’s capacity to 
participate effectively in the work environment (Shrey & Lacerete, 1995).  If differs 
from disability management in that it typically refers to a set of coordinated and 
managed processes that typically apply from the time and occasion of the injury event 
(Heads of Workers Compensation Authorities, 1997) 
A major catalyst to the introduction of injury management within occupational 
rehabilitation was the Grellman Report (1997) in New South Wales.  This report 
identified shortcomings in workers’ compensation systems and highlighted the need 
for early intervention and proactive management to effect a timely return to work.  
Early intervention involves attention to the employee as soon as the injury occurs.  To 
effect early intervention, immediate contact with all stakeholders involved in the 
injury management situation (i.e., the worker, the employer, the treating medical 
practitioner) is essential.  This principle has been shown to significantly reduce the 
costs of managing an injury and minimising time away from the workplace.  Indeed, 
some research has indicated that early access to injury management significantly 
promotes an early return to work (Heads of Worker’s Compensation Authorities - 
HWCA, 1997).  Furthermore, early intervention strategies and early return to work 
programmes are more likely to result in decreased worker’s compensation and 
disability costs, increased employer productivity and minimisation of lost work time 
(Shrey & Lacerete, 1995).  It is important to recognise that to delay injury 
management is to jeopardise outcomes for the worker, resulting in a deterioration of 
the worker’s condition and, therefore, their health.  Injury management should also 
assist in diminishing the likelihood of litigation as there is more potential for the 
worker to remain aligned with the workplace (Shrey & Lacerte, 1995).    
 
Effective injury management also relies heavily on the principle of proactive 
management.  Proactive management requires the timely use of employer-based 
resources and community based interventions (i.e., medical management services, 
gradual return to work programmes, possible modifications to the work place and 
physical conditioning), if the control and/or minimisation of costs and maintenance of 
work is to be achieved.  The benefit of proactive management in relation to the return-
to-work process is reflected in the reduction of time off work.  For example, a recent 
study found that the implementation of proactive management strategies in a specific 
workplace resulted in a significant reduction in the number of lost work days -- 5000 
over an eighteen month period (Smith, 1994). In essence the sooner a worker returns 
to work – or indeed, remains at work -- the more likely he or she is to recover. 
 
Disability management 
 
A relatively new variant on the case management and injury management processes 
that has not yet been adequately implemented or tested in Australia is disability 
management.  This concept is defined as a; 
“workplace prevention and remediation strategy that seeks to prevent 
disability from occurring or, lacking that, to intervene early following the 
onset of disability, using coordinated, cost-conscious, quality 
rehabilitation service that reflects an organisational commitment to 
continued employment of those experiencing functional work limitations” 
(Akabas, Gates & Galvin, 1992, p. 2).   
 
As described by Habeck, Kress, Scully and Kirschner (1994), the rehabilitation 
community is a natural resource to help employers meet the challenges of disability.  
Rehabilitation professionals who apply a true disability management approach offer 
employers the opportunity to examine their occupational health and safety strategies, 
implement primary prevention programmes, effectively prevent decline among 
employees who experience stress, and facilitate efficient return to work for those who 
are injured.  As a result, employer costs will be minimised.  However, as pointed out 
by Habeck and Munrowd (1987), rehabilitation facilitators will need to extend their 
skills and competencies, particularly in relation to organisational development, if they 
are to move from traditional case management or injury management to disability 
management. Westmoreland and Buys (2002), in a discussion of disability 
management in a selection of Australian self-insured companies, express caution on 
the unresearched adoption of disability management without accounting for cultural 
differences. Notwithstanding this, the authors’ argue for a range of organisational 
based strategies that could be effectively employed by rehabilitation counsellors.  
Biggs (2003) has envisioned situations where the rehabilitation professional can be 
operating in a transitionally leaderless environment, communicating with hostile 
workers, interacting with distant and resistant fellow professionals, and seeking 
structure in a very fluid organisational environment. In such challenging 
circumstances, he argues for a set of sophisticated skills in the areas of disability 
management, job development and placement, and worker's compensation given that 
these services are arguably the types of services that are vulnerable as discrete siloed 
services in today's economic conditions and business climates.  Organisations are 
likely to seek a consolidation of these services to be provided by one broad-based 
organizational consultant with skills in job design, work flow analyses, organizational 
development, as well as disability-related issues. This is not unfamiliar territory to 
rehabilitation counsellors at present, but competency acquisition and retention will 
need to be undertaken under a continuing education or professional development 
process. 
  
The application of client-centered processes under the rubrics of case, injury or 
disability management would enable progressive gains in the construction and coal-
mining industries.  There is a great deal to be understood and negotiated by all parties 
if long term absence following injury is to be addressed and remediated.  However, 
the overall goals of employer cost reduction, insurance premium savings, lower 
employee turnover, more effective workforce practices, safer working environments, 
and ultimately more efficient and effective industries can only be enhanced by early 
and consistent application of such management processes as just discussed and 
provide opportunities for appropriately skilled rehabilitation counsellors.  
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